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BARGAINING WITH STAKEHOLDERS:
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
by
Julianne Nelson*
Corporate codes of conduct or ethics have become increasingly
popular in recent years. Of the 264 companies responding to
a recent Conference Board survey, more than 75% had some form
of ethics code; almost half of the firms with codes in place
had adopted them since 1987. 1 Nor is the adoption of codes
merely a recent phenomenon:
a 1980 study by White and
Montgomery found that almost 100% of the largest US
corporations had codes in place. 2
When, if ever, would a self-interested shareholder support a
corporate code of conduct?
Do such codes ever increase
shareholder wealth? If one relies on instincts honed by the
study of competitive markets, one is likely to assume that
benefits for customers, suppliers, employees and the local
community necessarily come at the expense of corporate
shareholders.
The very structure of the much-publicized
Johnson and Johnson (J&J) Credo (reprinted in the Appendix)
appears to support this hypothesis. When detailing corporate
responsibilities,
the Credo mentions the interests of
corporate shareholders last, only after it enumerates the
duties owed to a variety of other stakeholders.
In effect,
the J&J Credo seems to implement a plural purpose view of the
firm that asks managers to serve a number of constituencies.
It remains to be seen whether or not this approach could also
benefit a strictly self-interested shareholder.
Recent results from applied bargaining theory suggest that the
J&J Credo may actually increase shareholder wealth in some
circumstances.
Institutional theorists have recently turned
to "cooperative" solution concepts to determine the efficiency
implications of different corporate ownership structures. In
general, research in this area starts from the assumption that
* Assistant Professor, Economics Area, Stern School of
Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, New York,
NY 10003. I would like to thank Robert Lindsay for his most
helpful comments on an earlier version of this work.
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the output of a particular firm is the
of
effort
and that at least some individual contr1but1ons to th1s output
cannot be observed or measured accurately.
contracting" on the basis of individual effort 1s 1mp?ss1ble
in this context,
it becomes necessary to. spec1fy an
alternative rule for allocating corporate prof1ts among the
relevant
In general, the rules proposed depend on both the surJ?lus
generated by the group as a whole and the al ternat1 ves
available to subgroups (or "coalition:-"> should they C:hoose to
opt out of the bargain.
The ava1lable alternat1yes (or
default options) are in turn defined by the property r1ghts of
the coalition members. For example, Hart and Moore (1990) use
the surplus sharing rule proposed by Lloyd Shapley.(1953) to
study the impact of decentralized asset ownersh1p on the
investment efforts of corporate claimants. In
wo:k,
Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) use the
to characterize the impact of allow1ng subs1d1ar1es to
"defect" by refusing to trade with their parent company.
In this paper, I adapt the model developed by Hart and Moo:e
(1990) to illustrate the incentive effects of the
structure implied by the J&J credo. I assume the s?c1al value
of a firm's activities depends on the effort (or
undertaken bv both shareholders and (non-equ1ty-own1ng)
stakeholders.J
In other words,
I
assume that . 'both
shareholders and stakeholders may take costly (and noncontractible) actions to increase the value of output
by the firm.
The benefits and the costs of th1s noncontractible effort depend on the share of corporate assets
initially allocated to each player. 4
This scenario arises whenever the firm's cost of
depends on employee care,
on employees'
f1rm-spec1f1c
expertise or on the range of amenities
by the local
community. It also arises when company prof1ts.depend on the
firm • s reputation or on the care and precaut1ons .taken by
consumers.
Each of these
can be
as a
duopoly in which each player's 1nvestment
depends
both on his or her anticipated share of the f1rm's surplus and
on the action taken by the other player.
Read literally
the J&J Credo strengthens the bargaining
position of
stakeholders by enhancing their default
options.
If treated as a contract, the Credo would
essentially give workers, suppliers, customers, the local
community etc. grounds for suit if J&J fails to treat these
fairly. To formalize this commitment by J&J, I
characterize the Credo as a transfer of some corporate assets
from shareholders to stakeholders.
For the purposes of exposition, I limit discussion to workers
as representative (non-equity owning) stakeholders, and assume
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that th: asset to be allocated between shareholders and
workers .1s worker health. For example, J&J shareholders would
have - 1n the absence of the Credo - an ownership claim of
to both
assets of the firm and the health
of 1ts employees.
W1thout the Credo, J&J would be limited
only.by.imJ?erfect OSHA supervision and workers• compensation
prem1a 1f
chose to overlook workplace hazards. Since the
Credo prom1ses workers better on-the-job conditions
it
reduces the precautions that workers must take on their
to
protect their physical (and emotional) health.
In this paper, I show that such an asset transfer may increase
both the total surplus generated by the firm and the wealth of
. . As the asset transfer strengthens the
barga1n1ng pos1t1on of workers vis a vis shareholders
it
strengthens the incentive (and lowers the cost) for
to
on behalf of the firm. Shareholders have
the 1ncent1ve to transfer assets if the gains from increased
worker effort more than offset the cost of the enhanced worker
position combined with the cost of the transfer
1tself.

1.

Notation

first task is to .define the surplus generated by the
d1fferent player comb1nations for a given allocation of
corporate assets.
I assume that there are two "players"· I
label the representative shareholder/manager (the "owner") 1 as
player 1 and the representative worker/stakeholder as player
2· .
assume that production requires a combination of
assets (a 11 .a2 ) and player effort (x
x ).
For
11
2
cons1st7ncy of notat1on, let x 1 represent the
level
of
manager1al effort chosen by player 1 and let x represent the
2
level of worker effort chosen by player 2.
The existing assets to be allocated are the firm's physical
plant and worker health.
I assume throughout that while
shareholders own all of the firm's physical plant workers may
only own a
their health.
More
let a
represent the ex1st1ng physical plant and let a represent1
2
worker health.
I assume that player 1 owns all of asset a
while pl?Y7r 2 owns. only a fraction a, osas1, of asset
rema1n1ng fract1on (1-a) of asset a 2 is owned by player
To. illustrate the structure of the bargaining problem that
and workers, I use the following general
notat1on to
the value of output (or joint surplus)
produced by d1fferent player coalitions:
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output of owner and worker together:
Output produced by owner alone:

V

(XI 1 X2l al 1 a2)

v(x 1 la 11 (1-a)a 2)

output produced by worker alone:

v (x21aa 2 )

Output of the "empty" coalition:

v(O)

=

0

From this notation it follows that the value of output for a
particular coalition depends on both the assets owned (ai) by
coalition members and the levels of effort (xi) that members
undertake.
I assume that the structure of asset ownership also affects
the cost of effort for individual players. In particular,
cost of owner effort:

c 1 (x 1 la 1 , (1-a)a 2 )

cost of worker effort:

c 2 (x2 laa 2) ·

This notation indicates that an individual player's cost of
effort depends on the assets he or she owns, but not on the
level of effort undertaken by the other members of the
coalition. These cost functions also reflect the assumption
that the representative worker owns a share a of asset a 2 and
has no ownership claim on asset a 1 • 7
2.

(1988, p. 271) demonstrates that the Shapley value is the only
sharing rule that (1) fully distributes output; (2) treats
identical players equally; and (3) determines individual
shares strictly on the basis of individual contributions to
output.
Hart and Moore (1990, p. 1129) observe that the
Shapley value mechanism gives each player his or her "expected
contribution to a coalition, where the expectation is taken
over all coalitions to which [the player] might belong. 1110
Any of these cooperative bargaining approaches provide the
basis for an argument that market participants would agree in
advance to use a Shapley value mechanism as the means of
allocating output in the future. 11 •12
To define the Shapley values for the bargaining game between
a representative owner and a representative worker, I first
observe that each of these two players is potentially a member
of two coalitions: a coalition "of the whole" and a coalition
consisting of the player alone.
If each player bears his or
her full cost of effort, then the net benefit to each player
when output is allocated using Shapley's method is given by
W1

.5(v(x 1 ,x2 la 1 ,a2 )

max (ov(x 1 ,x2 )

-

v(x 1 )]

[

(1-o)v(x 1 ,x2) - v(x2 )]

0

proposed by Nash (1950). 9
Starting from a slightly different notion of justice, Young

-

v(O)]

- c 1 (x 1 la 1 , (1-a)a 2 )
.5[v(x 1 ,x2 la 1 ,a2 )

There are a variety of reasons to use a "Shapley value"
mechanism to allocate the rewards of joint effort.
It is
well-known that such a mechanism implements the "Nash
bargaining solution" for two-person games. 8 In other words,
output allocated on the basis of Shapley values would maximize
the product of gains realized by individual players relative
to their respective default utilities.
More formally, a
Shapley value mechanism would solve the allocation problem

v(x2 jaa2 )]

+ .5[v(x 1 ja 1 , (1-a)a 2 )

The Bargaining Problem

Given the production and cost functions specified in Section
1 it remains to define and solve the bargaining problem that
between owners and workers for a given allocation of
existing assets.
To divide up the results of joint
production, I rely on the "cooperative" approach proposed in
Shapley (1953). This solution concept gives to each player a
share of output equal to the player's average incremental
contribution to the coalitions of which it might be a member.

-

+ .5[v(x2 jaa 2 )
-

-

(2 .1)
-

v(x 1 ja 11 (1-a)a 2 )]

v(O)]

c 1 (x 2 1aa 2 )

(2.2)

The first bracketed term in each of these equations represents
the contribution the player makes to the coalition of whole:
the difference between the value of output with both players
and the value of output with only one player indicates the
"value added" by the second player. The second bracketed term
in each of these equations represents the contribution of (or
value added by) each player to the empty coalition, v(O).
Using the payoffs specified in equations (2.1) and (2.2), we
can now define the equilibrium for the bargaining problem at
issue.
Assume that both the representative owner and the
representative worker choose their effort levels x 1 and x 2 to
maximize their respective payoffs.
If each player takes the
choice made by the other as given, then the first order
conditions
.5v.(x 1*,x2 *la 11 a 2 ) + .5v.Cx 1*ja 1 , (1-a)a 2 )
- c 1 (x 1*la 1 , (1-a)a 2 ) =

o

( 2. 3)
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.5v2(x 1*,x2*la 11 a 2) + .5v2 (x2*laa2)
- c 2 (x 2*laa2) = 0

( 2. 4)

jointly determine the equilibrium effort choices, x 1* and
x *.n
Given these effort choices, the equilibrium payoffs
2
(i.e.
, net benefits) for the representat.i ve . owner* and the
representative worker ar.e
by. subst1.tut1.ng Xt
and X2*
into the objective funct1.ons g1.ven 1.n (2.1) and (2.2).
3.

The Asset Allocation Problem

The previous section defined equilibrium
a
allocation of the assets a 1 and a 2. It now rema1.ns to see l.f
the representative owner has the incentive to adopt a code of
corporate conduct that would effectively
some
all) of a to the
(Thl.s transfer l.S
2
formally characterized as an 1.ncrease 1.n the parameter a.)
To determine the effect of adopting a code, it is
necessary to indicate the specific impact of asset
on the productivity and cost of player
a
(and thereby increasing a worker's ownershl.p cla1.m on hl.S or
her health) would potentially have several effects .. It
strengthen the bargaining position of workers by 1.ncreas1.ng
the default utility v(x2 laa 2) for each level of effort X2. The
asset transfer could also lower worker effort costs by
decreasing c 2 (x 21ax2) andjor raise owner effort .costs by
increasing ct<x 11a2, (1-a)a 2). In summ"':ry, I
a code
of conduct as a commitment to an 1.mprovement 1.n workplace
conditions. This transfer of corporate assets from owners to
workers gives workers a greater ownership
on their own
health. It potentially increases the product1.v1.ty and lowers
the cost of worker effort while it raises the cost of owner
effort.
To evaluate the impact of such transfers on
choices and on the net benefits realized, I exam1.ne a spec1.f1.c
production technology and set of cost functions.
Let the
value of output produced by the set of possible coalitions be
given by
owner and worker together:
p + ( a2x2) p] t ip
V (X11 X2I a 1, a 2) = [ (a I X1)
Owner alone:

v (x 1 l a 11

(

worker alone:
v(x2 laa 2)

1-a) a 2 )

asset a 2 has no impact on output unless player 2 is also a
member of the coalition . 14
In other words, the owner's claim
on worker health [(1-a)a 2) is meaningless unless the worker is
involved in production. Restricting the parameter p so that 1
> p > 0 ensures that (1) worker effort is an imperfect
substitute for owner effort (and vice versa); and that (2)
owners and workers produce more when working together than
when working separately. 15
Let the cost of effort for the representative owner and the
representative worker be given by
c 1(x 1la 11 (1-a)a 2)
and

respectively. This specification reflects the assumption that
asset ownership may influence the cost of effort for either or
both players .
The extent of the effect depends on the
parameters o, e, and A: the larger any of these parameters,
the larger the cost-reducing impact of asset ownership.
4.

The owner's Incentives to Adopt

This specification reflects the assumptions that player 2 is
indispensable to asset a 2:
player 1' s ownership share of

Code of conduct

We can now determine when, if ever, a code of conduct can
increase shareholder wealth.
As mentioned above
I
characterize the adoption of a code as an increase in a, i'. e.,
a (partial or complete) transfer of asset a 2 from owners to
. . Given the
specified in Section 3, the
1.ncrease 1.n a has three d1.rect effects on effort choices: as
it (1) increases the representative worker's marginal benefit
of effort and (2) lowers the worker's marginal cost of effort
it also (3) raises the representative shareholder's marginai
cost of effort.
It follows that, for a wide range of
parameter values, an increase in a implies more worker effort
and less owner effort in equilibrium.
The net impact of
adopting a code of conduct therefore depends on the balance
between these effort effects.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the equilibrium effort choices and
net benefits for the following parameter values: 16
v(xltx21alla2) = [ (20xt)4/S + (20x2)4'sJs'4
v(x 1 l a 11 ( 1-a) a 2 )
v(x 2 laa 2 )

= aa 2x 2.

= c 1x//(1+oa 1+e(1-a)a2)

=

a20x2

ct<xtla 11 (1-a)a 2) = 20x 12/(1+20+(1-a)160)
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The Role of Economic Analysis
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The next step is to discover why the assignment of rights
matters. Is the reason plausibly described as a "transaction
cost"? It is clear that the allocation of rights in the model
affects both effort costs and output shares for market
participants. It therefore influences the equilibrium level
of production. However, the source of the transaction costs
is not immediately obvious since the code of conduct (i.e.,
the transfer of a 2 ) is assumed to be costlessly enforceable.
The transaction costs in the model can be traced to the
assumption that owner and worker effort levels are "noncontractible" . 19 In other words, neither owners nor workers
can write binding "forcing" contracts to ensure optimal levels
of effort. 20 There are a variety of possible justifications
for such an assumption:
effort levels may not be directly
observable or the courts may have found contracts contingent
on effort to be "against public policy." In any event, the
non-contractibility assumption forces market participants to
resort to sharing rules such as the Shapley value mechanism.
Given the impossibility of achieving a first-best optimum21
with forcing contracts, we must then ask whether or not
voluntarh exchange will at least support a second-best
optimum. 2 In other words, will initial trade in the asset a 2
ensure that the surplus-maximizing level of a (.36 in Figure
2) prevails in equilibrium?
Economists are conditioned to
answer this question in the
almost as an article
of faith.
In fact, the appropriateness of this response
depends on the extent of transactions costs at the very
earliest stage of the bargaining process.
In their description of a model that served as an inspiration
for the one presented in this paper, Hart and Moore (1990, p.
1131) write
We shall take the point of view that efficient trading at
date 0 leads to a control structure a that maximizes
W(x<(a)).
That is, if the initial a does not maximize
W(x<(a)), someone will propose a new a and a set of side
payments such that everyone is better off ... 23
In the model I propose, the equilibrium level of total surplus
depends on the scope for trade in ap
Figure 2 and the
analysis in Section 4 indicate that owners do have some
incentive to make unilateral transfers to workers for a wide
range of parameter values.
However, the value of a that
maximizes shareholder wealth (.86 in Figure 2) generally fails
to maximize total surplus.
It is therefore not likely that
owners would in general adopt the "optimal" code of ethics
unilaterally.
Would workers have the incentive to purchase a greater stake
in a 2 and thereby make it possible for society as a whole to
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realize a second best optimum? In other words, can we rely on
workers (along with other stakeholder groups) to bargain for
the optimal code of ethics?
such a transaction would
resurrect a "Cease-like" invariance result at this earlier
stage in the contracting process: if there were a competitive
market in a 2 , then there would be no efficiency justification
for regulating the contracting process.
There would be no
reason to require minimum workplace health and safety
standards, to adopt environmental protection laws, or to set
minimum product safety standards.
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Economic analysis cannot provide a definitive answer to these
policy questions; it merely enables us to examine the
consequences of difference sets of assumptions.
All policy
applications of economic models start with a strong set of
assumptions. The "transferrable utility" model presented in
this paper requires that rights (however assigned) be
costlessly enforceable and that $1 be worth the same to
workers as to
If we further assume that there is
a competitive market in assets like worker health and
environmental quality, then equilibrium will be (second-best)
efficient; the initial allocation of assets will simply
determine the final distribution of wealth. If, on the other
hand, we assume that there are unavoidable transaction costs
at this earlier bargaining stage, then the initial allocation
of assets affects both the level of total surplus and its
distribution.
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Concluding Observations

Do we wish to use this type of economic analysis as a guide to
the initial allocation of rights? 25 Economic analysis itself
cannot resolve this issue.
We must ultimately return to
extra-market notions of justice, fairness and probably just
plain common sense.
The discussion in Section 5 provides an outline for this
expanded view of policy analysis.
The first task is to
identify the transaction costs at each stage in the bargaining
process.
If there are no transaction costs, we are left to
determine the fairness of the equilibrium distribution of
wealth given the initial allocation of rights.
If the
transaction costs (like the non-contractibility of effort)
render (competitive) bargaining impossible at some stage, we
are faced with a more difficult task, that of choosing the
appropriate trade-off between equity and efficiency.
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Appendix:

The Johnson

Johnson credo

we believe our first responsibility is
to the doctors, nurses and patients,
.
to mothers and all others
use our products
In meeting their needs
we do must be of h1gh qual1ty.
we must constantly str1ve to reduce our costs
in order to maintain reasonable prices.
customers' orders must be serviced promptly and
our suppliers and
must ?ave an opportun1ty
to make a fa1r prof1t.
we are responsible to our employees,
the men and women who work with us throughout the world.
Everyone must be considered as an individual.
we must respect their dignity and r.ecog.nize t.hei.r merit.
They must have a sense of secur1ty 1n the1r JObs.
compensation must be fair and adequate,
and working conditions clean, orde.rly and safe. .
E ployees must feel free to make suggest1ons and compla1nts.
:'here must be equal opportunity for emploY:me.nt, development
and advancement for those qual1f1ed.
we must provide competent management,
and their actions must be just and ethical.
we are responsible to the communities in which we live and work
and to the world community as well.
we must be good citizens - support good works and charities
and bear our fair share of taxes.
we must encourage civic improvements
and better health and education.
we must maintain in good order
the property we are privileged to use,
protecting the environment and natural resources.
our final responsibility is to our stockholders.
Business must make a sound profit.
we must experiment with new ideas.
Research must be carried on, innovative programs developed
and mistakes paid for.
New equipment must be purchased, new facilities provided
and new products launched.
Reserves must be created to provide for adverse times.
When we operate according to these principles,
the stockholders should realize a fair return.
Endnotes:
1.

conference Board (1992, P· 11}.

2.
White and Montgomery (1980, pp. 81-83.)
See Pitt and
Groskaufmanis (1990, p. 1602} for a discussion of this and
other survey results.
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3.
DeGeorge (1990, p. 163) defines stakeholders to be all
constituencies to which the firm "has any moral obligations".
s (1984, p. 46) definition includes "any group or
1nd1v1dual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of
the organization's objectives." For convenience of exposition
I adopt a somewhat narrower definition. In this paper I use
the term "stakeholder" to indicate the set of all
claimants except equity owners.
This group
tydp1tchally includ7s employees, suppliers, customers, clients,
an
e surround1ng community.

4. This treatment of effort costs and asset ownership differs
from that found in Hart and Moore (1990).
I allow for
asset ownership rather than assuming that assets are
1nd1v1s1ble lumps that must be allocated in full to a single
play7r.
I also allow asset ownership to influence the
marg1nal cost of effort as well as its marginal product.
5.
By "ownership" here I mean the right to use an asset
without having to purchase it· the right to obtain full
compensation if the asset is 'damaged; and the right to
withhold access to the asset.
6.
This assumption reflects a more general definition of
ownership than the one found in Hart and Moore (1990)
Allowing fractional values for a enables me to treat
as a diver;;e asset. ."Fractional ownership" makes it
poss1ble to cons1der a var1ety of compensation levels for
worker illness or injury.
7.

Note that since the functions
v (x1I . , . )

-

c 1 ( x 1 I . , . ) and

v ( x2l • ) - C2 ( x2l • )
indicate. the opportunities available to individual players
when act1ng alone, these functions define the "default" or
"reservation" utilities at given levels of effort for owners
and workers respectively.
8.

See Shapley (1988 reprint of 1969 article, p. 316).

9.
This is a game with "transferrable" utility:
monetary
transfers have the same value to both players. The parameter
o ser.ves to allocate joint output between the two players.
The f1rst bracketed term represents the difference between the
share received by player 1 and that player's default
ut1l1ty.
The
second
bracketed
term
represents
the
corresponding difference for player 2.
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10.
Rothblum (1988) provides three specifications of the
Shapley mechanism in which "a player gets 'the average
relative payoff to coalitions that contain him'."
11 .
For transferrable utility games with two players,
Shapley value allocation also coinc.ides wit;h the
bargaining solution proposed by Davl.d G.authl.er. See Gautl:aer
(1986)
and
for
a
of. the . ethl.<;=al
underpinnings of hl.s approach to l.ndl.Vl.dual r1ghts l.n socl.al
contracts.
The Shapley value mechanism can also be
generalized to allow for differences in bargaining ability
andjor broader definitions of egalitarian allocations.
See
Kalai and Samet (1985, 1988).
12.
Recent authors have also argued argue that the
value mechanism can be interpreted in a more "strategJ.c"
context as a noncooperative bargaining solution.
Hart and
Moore (1990, pp. 1129-30, footnote 11) observe that the
Shapley value can be .interpreted
th7 subgame perfect
equilibrium for a multJ.stage game l.nvolvl.ng a
of
take-it-or-leave-it contracts.
Gul
(1989)
provl.des an
alternative interpretation for the Shapley value as a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
13. More formally, these first order
<;ire
and sufficient for an equilibrium if both ob)ectl.ve functJ.ons
(W 1 and W2) are differentiable and stri<;=tly
(i.e;,. have
a maximum) .
Sufficient for concav1ty l.s that addl.tl.onal
effort increases output at a decreasing rate and increases
cost at an increasing rate:
V1(x 1,x2)>0,
Vu(XuX2)<0,
v 2 (x 11 x 2)>0, v 22 (x 11 x 2)<0, vdx 1)>0, Vu(Xd<O, v 2(x2)>0,
c 1 ' (xd>O, c 1' ' (xd>O, c 2 ' (x2)>0, and c 2' ' (x2)>0 .. The equl.ll.brl.l;lm
defined by (2.3)
and (2.4)
is stable l.f V12 (XuX2) l.S
sufficiently small. This last condition ensures
a
in effort choice by a given player has a greater l.mpact on J.ts
own objective function than on the objective function of the
other participants in the game.
14.

This terminology is due to Hart and Moore (1988).

15.
To see the benefit of joint effort with this
specification, let a 1=a 2=1; a=1 and p=. 5.
It follows that
v(x 11 x 2) = x 1 + x 2 + 2(x 1x 2) 5 >
+ v(x2) .= .x 1 + x2" .In. other
words, the value of output from the coall.tl.on consJ.stJ.ng of
one worker and one owner exceeds the sum of what the worker
and the owner can each produce separately.
16.

In particular, p=4 15, a 1=a 2=c 1=c 2=2 o, 5=1 and €=A=8.

17.
Coase (1988), p. 170.
For an earlier version of the
Coase theorem, see Coase (1959), p. 27: "The delimitation of
rights is an essential prelude to market
...
ultimate result (which maximizes the value of productJ.on) l.S

independent of the legal decision."
18 . . Newberry (1989, pp. 215-16) provides an overview of the
debate over pollution externalities that has involved
Pl.gou, Coase, Baumel, Oates and others since the 1930s.
19. Since it is impossible to write and enforce this type of
contract, the cost of the "transaction" is effectively
infinite.
20 . .A forcing contract promises payment if and only if effort
l.n some cases output) reaches a pre-specified level. see
Ml.ller ( 1992, Chapter 5) for a discussion of the uses and
of this device as a method of eliminating free
rl.ders.
21.
A
best" optim.um is an equilibrium that is fully
Pareto effl.cl.ent : all gal.ns from trade have been realized.
22. A "second-best" optimum is the best feasible equilibrium
given the constraints imposed by technology and various
transaction costs.
23. In the notation found in Hart and Moore (1990) is similar
to that used in this paper:
a indicates the allocation of
assets that exist when bargaining begins, while W(X0 (a))
represents the sum of net benefits realized by market
participants.
24 . This latter assumption ensures that there are no "wealth
effects" that distort owner andjor worker willingness-to-pay.
25 ·
Coase has long recommended this approach.
See Coase
(1988) for his response to a number of his critics.
Posner
(1979, 1983) labels this approach "wealth maximization" and
recommends it as a guide for judicial decision-making.
Coleman (1984) provides a review of the criticisms of Posner's
argument.
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